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What Is the Scope of the Federal
Tort Claims Act's Waiver
of Sovereign Immunity?
by Ralph Anzivino
PRE1,TEW)f Unitcd States Supreme Court Cases, pages 2.3-2S. © 2005 American Bar \smciation
ISSUE
Does the Federal Tort Claims Act's
waiver of sovereign immunity under
circumstances in which the United
States, if a private person, would be
liable, cover the conduct of a federal
mine inspector?
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
waives the sovereign immunity of
the United States for torts of federal
employees acting within the scope
of their employment "under circum-
stances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(1). In addition, Congress
has vested the federal district courts
with exclusive jurisdiction to hear
such tort claims by providing that
the United States shall be liable "in
the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under
like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. §
2674.
The Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977 (Mine Act) establishes a
comprehensive scheme designed to
promote the health and safety of the
nation's miners and improve work-
ing conditions in the nation's mines.
Pursuant to the Mine Act, the
Secretary of Labor, through the
Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA), promul-
gates health and safety standards for
coal and other mines. The Mine Act
places responsibility for compliance
with the health and safety regula-
tions upon the mine operator.
The Mine Act requires ISHA to per-
form frequent mine inspections and
investigations each year to deter-
mine whether an imminent danger
exists and whether the mine opera-
tor is complying with the Act. MSIIA
is required to inspect each under-
ground mine in its entirety at least
four times a year. The Act also pro-
vides for an immediate inspection
by MSHtA when a miner or a repre-
sentative of miners provides a writ-
ten and signed notice that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a
violation of the Mine Act or of a
mandatory health or safety standard
exists, or that an imminent danger
exists.
(Continued on Pcgc 24)
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Respondent miners Joseph Olson
and Javier Vargas were seriously
injured on January 31, 2000, in a
mining accident at the Mission
Underground Mine, a copper mine in
Arizona that is owned and operated
by Asarco Mining Company. The
miners were injured when a rock
slab weighing nine tons fell from the
ceiling of the mine. Respondents
allege that, about a year before the
accident, in January 1999, MSHA
Supervisor James Kirk, who was sta-
tioned in the Mesa, Arizona Field
Office, received an anonymous writ-
ten complaint alleging that Asarco
used inadequate ground support and
roof bolting in its Mission Mine. That
complaint asserted that the company
had barricaded areas to prevent fed-
eral inspectors from observing unsafe
conditions. Between May and
September 1999, Kirk also received
five anonymous telephone calls com-
plaining about safety conditions at
the Mission Mine. The callers asked
that the mine be inspected for sever-
al conditions, including lack of roof
bolting to prevent rock falls.
Respondents allege that despite
those complaints, Kirk did not order
or conduct an immediate and thor-
ough inspection of the mine. Finally,
Respondents allege that during a reg-
ularly scheduled inspection of the
Mission Mine in September 1999,
MSHA inspector Alan Varland was
approached by a miner who com-
plained about unsafe conditions.
Respondents allege that, although
the miner asserted that Asarco did
not use sufficient measures to pre-
vent rock falls, the inspector did not
conduct a thorough inspection for
those conditions.
In June 2012, Respondents sued the
United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, alleging that MSHA
had been negligent in its inspection
of the mine and that the United
States therefore is liable for the
injuries the miners suffered in the
January 2000 accident.
Respondents' claims of negligence
are based on the allegations that
(1) Kirk failed to evaluate and act
sufficiently upon the six anonymous
complaints he received between
May and September 1999 regarding
safety hazards at the mine; and
(2) Varland failed to inspect the
mine thoroughly in September
1999. The United States moved to
dismiss Respondents' complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim.
The district court granted the gov-
ernment's motion to dismiss. It held
that Respondents' allegations failed
to state a claim for tort liability
under the law of the place where
the alleged tortuous acts or omis-
sions occurred. The court ruled that
the liability of the United States
under the FTCA is defined as the
liability imposed by the state upon a
private person in like circum-
stances, and that even if a specific
behavior is statutorily required of a
federal employee, the government is
not liable under the FTCA unless
state law recognizes comparable lia-
bility for private persons. The dis-
trict court determined that negli-
gent inspection claims in Arizona
are governed by Sections 323 and
324A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which set forth the "Good
Samaritan" doctrine. The Good
Samaritan doctrine describes the
contours of the tort liability of one
who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to
another that he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of
either that person or a third person.
Under the Restatement, such a
Good Samaritan is liable for his neg-
ligent failure to exercise reasonable
care in rendering those services
only if (1) his failure to exercise
reasonable care increases the risk of
physical harm; or (2) the harm is
suffered because either the person
he sought to help or a third person
relied upon his undertaking, or,
(3) with respect to an injured third
person, if the Good Samaritan
undertook to perform a duty owed
by another to the third person.
Applying those principles, the dis-
trict court concluded that Respond-
ents failed to state a claim under
the Good Samaritan doctrine. The
court reasoned that Respondents
alleged "no facts" that could support
a finding that MSHA's decisions
increased the risk of harm to them
or that MSHA undertook a duty that
Asarco owed to them.
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded. The Ninth
Circuit declined to apply the princi-
ples of Arizona tort law, under the
Good Samaritan doctrine. It rea-
soned that there is no private-sector
analogue for mine inspections
because private parties do not wield
regulatory power to conduct such
unique governmental functions.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit decided
that Arizona tort law applicable to
governmental entities should be
applied. The court identified the rel-
evant question as whether, under
Arizona law, state and municipal
entities would be liable under like
circumstances. It construed Arizona
law to provide that the state would
be subject to liability for a failure by
its mine inspectors to perform
mandatory safety inspections.
Therefore, the court concluded that
Respondents had stated a claim for
liability under the FTCA.
CASE ANALYSIS
The United States maintains that
the FTCA waives its sovereign
immunity only under circumstances
in which the United States, if a pri-
v'ate person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred. The plain text of the
FTCA clearly limits the United
States' tort liability to that of a pri-
vate person under state law, and it
Issue No. 1
confines the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral district courts to such claims.
The government contends that the
Ninth Circuit disregarded the
FTCA's plain text when it looked not
to the liability of private persons
under Arizona law, but to whether,
under Arizona law, state and munic-
ipal entities would be liable under
like circumstances. That approach,
the United States argues, cannot be
supported. It is automatic that when
a statute's language is plain, the sole
function of the courts is to enforce
it according to its terms. The text of
the FTCA simply leaves no room to
expand the United States's liability
without regard to whether a private
person would be liable in like cir-
cumstances to encompass the addi-
tional liability that a state has cho-
sen to impose upon its own govern-
mental entities.
The United States further asserts
that the Supreme Court's decisions
construing the "private individual"
language in the FTCA likewise fore-
close the conclusion reached by the
Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court
has long made clear that the liabili-
ty of the United States under the
FTCA must be judged by reference
to the liability imposed on private
individuals and not by reference to
the liability of a state or municipali-
ty. The Court so held in its seminal
decision in Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
In that case, the Court considered a
FTCA claim that the United State
was liable for the Coast Guard's
alleged negligence in the operation
of a lighthouse. The United States
contended that it was not liable
under the FTCA for the perfor-
mance of such "uniquely govern-
mental functions." In effect, the
Court observed, the United States
had sought to read the FTCA as
imposing liability in the same man-
ner as if the United States were a
municipal corporation rather than
as if it were a private person. The
Court expressly rejected that
approach, reasoning that it would
saddle the FTCA with the casu-
istries of municipal liability for
torts. Instead, the Court held that
even when the United States per-
forms uniquely governmental func-
tions, the question is not whether a
municipality would be liable, but
whether a private party would be
liable. That is so, the Court
explained, because the text of the
FTCA requires reference to the lia-
bility principles applicable to a pri-
vate individual in "like," not "the
same," circumstances. In addition,
the Supreme Court indicated that
the liability of the United States for
the Coast Guard's alleged negligence
in the operation of the lighthouse
should be resolved under the Good
Samaritan doctrine.
The United States contends that
resort to the FTCA's legislative his-
tory is unnecessary given its plain
language. But, it says, if the Court
were to turn to the legislative histo-
ry, that history demonstrates a con-
gressional purpose to expose the
United States to liability for the con-
duct of its employees only to the
extent that a private individual
would be liable under like circum-
stances. They say the FTCA was the
product of "nearly thirty years of
congressional consideration."
Congress's purpose in enacting the
FTCA was to relieve Congress and
the President from the burden of
disposing of the great number of pri-
vate claims filed each year seeking
redress for alleged tortuous conduct
by government employees. As the
federal government expanded its
activities, its agents caused a multi-
plying number of remediless
"wrongs" that would have been
actionable if inflicted by an individ-
ual or a corporation. Uppermost in
the collective mind of Congress
were the ordinary common-law torts
such as negligence in the operation
of vehicles, an example frequently
mentioned throughout the legisla-
tive history. The FTCA was passed
with precisely those kinds of
garden-variety torts in mind.
Because Congress was concerned
about the problems created by the
commission by government employ-
ees of ordinary common-law torts of
the sort that private persons com-
monly commit, it was natural that
Congress would choose to waive the
United States's sovereign immunity
for tort liability only under circum-
stances in which the United States,
if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant under state law. The
legislative history reveals no intent
to extend the United States's liabili-
ty beyond that of a private person
under state law so as to encompass
any additional liability that a state
may choose to impose upon its own
governmental entities. To the con-
trary, the legislative history con-
firms that Congress's purpose was to
make the tort liability of the United
States the same as that of a private
person under like circumstances, in
accordance with the local law.
The Ninth Circuit looked to
whether, under Arizona law, state
and municipal entities would be
liable under like circumstances. It
undertook this analysis based on its
conclusion that there is no private-
sector analogue for mine inspec-
tions because private parties do not
wield regulatory power to conduct
such "unique governmental func-
tions." The Ninth Circuit believed
that the liability of the United States
should instead be determined by
reference to an Arizona statute that
declares it to be the public policy of
the state that public entities are
liable for the acts and omissions of
their employees in accordance with
the statutes and common law of the
state. Determining that Arizona
could be liable under circumstances
similar to those in this case if the
actions had been taken by a state
(Continued on Page 26)
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mine inspector, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the federal govern-
ment should also be held liable. The
effect of the Ninth Circuit's
approach is to adopt a rule that
serves to maximize the liability of
the United States by subjecting it to
liability in tort under either the
principles governing liability of pri-
vate individuals or, if those princi-
ples do not result in liability, to the
principles applicable to governmen-
tal entities. It is, the United States
contends, wholly inconsistent with
well-established canons of construc-
tion to expand a waiver of sovereign
immunity beyond the explicit limit
in the statutory text to effectuate
such a rule of maximum liability.
The United States believes the
FTCA waived the sovereign immuni-
ty of the United States only in situa-
tions in which a private party would
be liable. Under this approach, in
circumstances in which a private
person would not be liable or that
involve a uniquely governmental
function with no private party ana-
log, the FTCA does not impose
liability.
The Respondents, on the other
hand, maintain that when private
persons do not regularly perform
the type of conduct complained of,
courts may look to an analogous
state actor under like circum-
stances. The United States attempts
to limit the FTCA's waiver of sover-
eign immunity by arguing that if
there is no private individual in like
circumstances, the United States is
simply not liable under the FTCA.
Yet according to the Respondents,
that position finds no support in the
FTCA's text or purpose and has
been repeatedly rejected by the
Supreme Court. They contend that
even when no private analogue
exists, the United States is liable for
the wrongful conduct of its agents
who commit torts that no private
individual would possess the author-
ity and opportunity to commit. The
FTCA's text does not limit liability
to the activities that private persons
perform. The Act refers to a "private
person" in relation to the "liability"
of a private person, not to the
"activities" of a private person. In
fact, the FTCA speaks of a govern-
ment employee acting within the
scope of his or her office or employ-
ment, which presumably would
more often than not involve govern-
mental actors performing govern-
mental duties.
The United States attempts to sup-
port its assertion that no liability
exists for activities private persons
do not perform by looking to the
legislative history of the Act. The
United States argues that Congress
had "only garden-variety torts" in
mind when passing the FTCA. From
that assertion, the United States
concludes that it was natural that
Congress would choose to waive the
United States's sovereign immunity
for tort liability only under circum-
stances in which the United States,
if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.
But, say the Respondents, that argu-
ment is a non sequitur. It does not
follow even from the United States's
interpretation of the FTCXs legisla-
tive history that Congress intended
to immunize the United States from
those activities for which there is no
direct private person analogue.
Congress created the FTCA because
it thought the government should
assume the obligation to pay dam-
ages for the misfeasance of its
employees in carrying out its work.
Had Congress intended that the gov-
ernment be liable only for "garden-
variety torts" such as negligent dri-
ving, it could have easily excluded
all regulatory activity from the
FTCA's reach. It did not do so.
Rather, the legislative history
demonstrates that Congress intend-
ed to provide a remedy to those
injured by the negligence of govern-
mental employees who were carry-
ing out the United States's work.
The FTCA provides that the United
States is liable for the negligence of
its employees so long as they are
acting within the scope of their
office or employment. The broad
and just purpose of the statute was
to compensate the victims of gov-
ernmental negligence in circum-
stances like those in which a private
person would be liable for his or her
personal negligence. The
Respondents contend that the
United States's argument is also
contradicted by the Supreme
Court's prior interpretations of the
FTCA. In Indian Towing, the Court
held that excluding liability for
activities that private persons do
not perform would be attributing
bizarre motives to Congress. The
Supreme Court refused to predicate
liability on such a completely fortu-
itous circumstance as the presence
or absence of identical private activ-
ity. No "private person" analogy was
available in Indian Towing because
private persons were not allowed to
operate lighthouses.
While the United States contends
that the FTCA language is "plain,"
the FTCA does not fully explain
what to do when the conduct com-
plained of is conduct that private
persons do not regularly perform.
Courts have typically filled this gap
in one of two ways. One, by imagin-
ing a private person and applying
the Good Samaritan doctrine, or
two, by looking to what the liability
of a state actor would be under state
law. Respondents contend that the
solution that best effectuates
Congress's intent is to look to a
state actor under state law so long
as doing so does not import state
governmental immunities or make
the United States liable to a greater
extent than a private person. This
Issue No. 1
solution is preferable, they say,
because a state actor in a factually
analogous situation is in the most
"like circumstances." In this case,
the state mine inspector provides
the most "like circumstances" avail-
able for judging whether the United
States, if a private person, would be
liable under the law of Arizona for
the negligent conduct of an MSHA
inspector. By looking to Arizona
state entity law, the Ninth Circuit
carried out in the most precise way
possible Congress's intent to impose
liability on the United States in
accordance with the law of the place
where the federal employee's act or
omission occurred. Any other result
would violate the "like circum-
stances" requirement because pri-
vate persons simply do not perform
regulatory inspections. If a state
government entity would be liable,
so, too, would the United States, as
long as that liability is not based on
a principle unique to governmental
entities. In other words, if the prin-
ciple of law that makes the govern-
mental entity liable under like cir-
cumstances is equally applicable to
a private person, the United States
is exposed to liability under the
FTCA.
Respondents further assert that
although regulatory inspections are
generally not performed by private
persons, looking to a state actor for
the most "like circumstances" will
not subject the United States to any
greater liability than that of a pri-
vate person under Arizona law.
Regulatory inspections are inherent-
ly governmental functions. The cas-
es in Arizona that discuss persons
who negligently conduct inspections
that they were required to conduct
involve governmental entities.
Examining those cases to determine
whether the United States would be
liable for like conduct in Arizona
does not expose the United States to
any greater liability than that of a
private person because in Arizona
the parameters of duty owed by the
state will ordinarily be coextensive
with those owed by a private per-
son. Liability does not turn on the
status of the actor. In Arizona, the
law applied to a state actor is the
same law that is applied to a private
individual, and a state actor is treat-
ed like a private litigant for tort pur-
poses. It has long been the law in
Arizona that employers or princi-
pals-individual, corporate, or gov-
ernmental-are responsible for the
tortuous wrongdoing committed by
their agents and employees acting
within the scope of their employ-
ment. To the extent a state govern-
ment entity and a private person
are equally liable under state law in
like circumstances, imposing liabili-
ty on the United States necessarily
comports with the FTCAs require-
ment that immunity be waived only
when a private person would be
liable under like circumstances. The
Ninth Circuit's decision in this case
is thus both permitted by and con-
sistent with the FTCAs "private per-
son" language.
Respondents further argue that the
text of the FTCA demonstrates that
Congress intended the United States
to be liable for negligence in the
course of carrying out statutory and
regulatory duties. The FTCA
excludes from liability any claim
based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the government exer-
cising due care in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation is valid.
By excluding liability for govern-
I ment employees who exercise due
care in the course of executing
statutes or regulations, the Act nec-
essarily includes liability for govern-
ment employees who do not exer-
cise due care. Congress could have
easily excluded liability for all viola-
tions of federal statutes or regula-
tions, but it did not. Interpreting the
FTCA to immunize the United
States from all liability while per-
forming acts required by statutes or
regulations would impose a result
clearly unintended by Congress.
Respondents further believe that the
weakness of the United States's
position becomes crystal clear when
one considers the "discretionary
function" exception to the FTCA
waiver of sovereign immunity. The
United States enjoys immunity to
FTCA liability when it exercises a
discretionary function. It is well set-
tled that no discretion is involved
when a federal statute or regulation
prescribes a course of action
because in that circumstance the
employee has no option but to fol-
low the directive. In other words, it
has long been the law that the
United States is immune from liabil-
ity when it performs discretionary
functions, but that it is exposed to
liability when it performs a function
pursuant to a federal statute or reg-
ulation that mandates that course of
action. Now, the United States is
arguing that It also cannot be liable
for its violations of even these
mandatory statutes and regulations.
Congress, the Respondents say, did
not intend such a result.
Finally, Respondents maintain that
the hypothetical "private person"
must be an individual with a "duty"
to inspect and not one who "chose"
to inspect. The confusion stemming
from the "private person under like
circumstances" analysis is com-
pounded when courts look to a "*pri-
vate person" but ignore the "under
like circumstances" requirement. To
satisfy the "like circumstances"
requirement, the hypothetical pri-
vate person who is used to deter-
mine liability under state law must
be a private person with a duty to
inspect, whether contractual or oth-
erwise. The FTCA provides that the
United States will be liable in the
same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual "under
(Continued on Page 28)
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like circumstances." In the context
of mine inspections, this means that
for the government to be liable, its
inspector must have been required
to inspect with due care. Any analo-
gy to a private person without a
duty to inspect with due care falls
short, and courts that rely on such
an analogy are comparing apples to
oranges. The United States correctly
points out that inspections often are
performed by private entities-
insurance companies, labor unions,
consultants, employers, and
landowners. But whether the private
person in those examples is subject
to liability is generally not depen-
dent on the Good Samaritan doc-
trine. In those examples, the inspec-
tor had a duty to inspect, whether
imposed by statute, contract, or
common law. There is thus no need
to find an additional duty in the
Good Samaritan doctrine. Similarly,
in this case, the United States had a
duty to inspect the mine. The "like
circumstances" analysis should
properly be applied to an individual
who has a duty to inspect with rea-
sonable care. The Good Samaritan
doctrine is clearly not applicable in
such a case. While it is true that in
Arizona, as in many other states,
the Good Samaritan doctrine can
provide a source of duty and liabili-
ty for FTCA purposes, in many cas-
es there is a better analogy.
Respondents say that in the case
now before the Court, the most
analogous person is a state mine
inspector.
SIGNIFICANCE
The federal government has more
than four million employees. The
Federal Tort Claims Act was passed
to waive the federal government's
sovereign immunity to permit those
injured by a federal employee to
recover their loss. The FTCA, how-
ever, describes its waiver as "under
circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be
liable." The United States's interpre-
tation of the waiver language
requires an analogue in the private
sector to impose liability. For exam-
ple, a federal employee driving a
vehicle that injures someone has an
analogue in the private sector, but a
federal mine inspector does not.
Therefore, it contends there is no
liability in this case. The
Respondents interpret that same
language to require courts to look
for a "like circumstance" analogue,
such as a state inspector, when
determining whether there is liabili-
ty. The Supreme Court will decide
which analogue is to be used for
future claims under the FTCA.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For the United States (Paul D.
Clement, Solicitor General (202)
514-2217)
For Joseph Olson, Monica Olson,
and Javier Vargas (Thomas G.
Cotter (520) 792-3836)
Issue No. 1
